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3 Symposium Speakers 
Professor .Jock R. Anderson 
Professor Anderson, who  is  head of the Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Business Management at the University of New England, Armidale, was Direc-
tor of the recently completed study of the impact of the International Agricultural 
Research  Centres (supported by  the Consultative Group on International Agricul-
tural Research-CGIAR), for  which Australia provides some funding.  The distin-
guished international group making the study is  about to publish its  findings. 
Over the past  14  years  Professor Anderson  has  held  consulting positions  with 
many international agricultural research centres, as  well  as  with  the World  Bank. 
This experience and his  position as  Director of the  impact study places Professor 
Anderson in  a partieularly good position to present an authoritative opinion on the 
impact of the international agricultural research effort on development. 
Professor John W.  Melior 
Professor Melior is  Director of the International Food  Policy Research  Institute 
(IFPRI)  in  Washington  D.e.  IFPRI  concentrates  on the  analysis  of alternative 
national and international strategies and policies for meeting the food needs of the 
world,  particularly  those  of low-income  countries  and the poorer groups  within 
them. IFPRI is one of the 13 international agricultural research centres supported by 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. 
Professor  MelIor,  who  was  previously  Professor of Agricultural  Economics  at 
Cornell  University,  is  a  recognised  world  authority  on  the  role  of agricultural 
development  in  the economic  growth  of developing  countries.  He  is  an  original 
thinker  who  has  published  extensively.  He  has  recently  involved  himself in  the 
argument on whether supporting agricultural development in developing countries 
creates competitors for U.S.  farmers or increases exports of U.S.  farm  produce by 
developing new  markets-an argument that is  also going on in  Australia. 
Dr Kym  Anderson 
Dr Anderson, who is  currently senior lecturer in economics at the University of 
Adelaide, has for many years taken a particular interest in  the effects of protection-
ism and other economic policies on agriculture in  Australia,  Asia and the Pacific, 
and in their effects on trade. He has held consulting positions with the World Bank, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  and other international centres,  as 
well  as  with  such  Australian  government  agencies  as  the  Bureau  of Agricultural 
Economics, the Department of Primary Industry and the Australian  International 
Development Assistance Bureau. His recent studies of the effects of market liberali-
sation on economic growth in  China,  a  country that represents  a  large  potential 
market for Australian food and fibre products, allow him to make an authoritative 
assessment  of how  providing  agricultural  development  assistance  to  China  may 
generate new  and expanding markets for  Australia. 
4 Foreword 
THERE is a popular perception that because of the apparent adequacy or surfeit of 
current world food  supplies there is  less  need  to sustain investments in agricultural 
research for development. This perception is  dubious for  a number of reasons. 
Firstly, research and technological change in  agriculture are powerful engines of 
economic growth of which enhanced physical supplies of agricultural commodities 
are but one manifestation. Technological change in agrieulture generates new income 
streams and economises on resources,  thus allowing their transfer to other sectors 
experiencing  demand growth  from  the  new  incomes,  induding the  foreign  trade 
sector. 
Secondly, the inexorable future growth of population and incomes will continue to 
generate  demands  for  increased  food  supplies  in  future.  With  the  usually  long 
gestation periods before agricultural research can be expected to generate viable new 
technological options,  if  is  important to maintain current research investments at 
levels  which  ensure  an appropriate and continuing supply  of innovations  in  the 
future. 
Finally, self-sufficiency strategies based on the attainment of notionally adequate 
supplies of each major agricultural commodity in individual countries, besides their 
potential  for  sacrificing  current  welfare  gains,  can also  distort  the  allocation of 
resources for  research in  ways  that imply future sacrifices. 
Against this background ACIAR decided to sponsor this symposium. The three 
eminent speakers-Professor Jock Anderson, Professor John Melior and Or Kym 
Anderson-were asked to address particular aspects of the subject. 
Professor Anderson was asked to examine ihe impact of agricultural research and 
technological change on food supplies, farm incomes, employment and consumers 
in  developing  countries.  Professor  Melior  was  requested  to  explore  the  linkages 
between technological change/agricultural growth in developing countries and non-
agricultural growth, poverty alleviation, human nutritional status and foreign trade. 
Or Anderson was  asked  to address the macroeconomic and trade implications of 
technological change and agricultural growth in developing countries. 
The three papers are included  in  this publication, along with  the commenlaries 
which were  prepared by  Professor Frank Jarrett, Emeritus Professor Heinz Arndt 
and Dr Alistair Watson. 
Or James Ryan, Deputy Director of ACIAR, was  responsible for organising the 
Symposium  and  the scientific editing of this  publication.  He was  assisted  in  the 
former by Or loe Remenyi,  previously Research Program Coordinator with AClAR 
(now  with  Deakin University) and Mrs  Pam Chapman, Research Services Officer. 
Mr Reg  MacIntyre assisted with the editing. We are grateful to CSIRO for making 
available  its  conference  facilities  at  Limestone  Avenue,  Canberra,  for  the  sym-
posium. 
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J.  R. McWilliam 
Director 
ACIAR ACIAR supports a number of projects in  the People's Republic of China, including areas such as the effect of 
chilling on rice production, the control of insect  pests, wool production and animal diseases. 
6 Opening Address 
Hon. Barry O. Jones 
Minister for Science,  Canberra 
FOR ANYONE who has followed the fortunes of Australian agriculture in recent times, 
one thing will surely be obvious: whatever the adverse effects of high interest rates, 
taxes and tariffs on the rural sector, there is  one big negative factor over which we 
have little control-the massive world surpluses of major export commodities. 
So  why  on  earth  should  Australia  be  involved  in  assisting  rural  research  in 
developing countries? Aren't we  merely wiping out potential markets for our prod-
ucts by  encouraging self-sufficiency in  countries where they could be sold? 
That, of course,  is  the conventional,  simplistic  view.  And as  I  think this  sym-
posium  will  amply  show,  it  is  also completely  wrong.  Give  developing  countries 
better technology for crop and animal production, grain storage, and so on, and you 
don't just increase output. You  change their whole economic environment. You  fuel 
the engine of economic growth.  You  increase  the number of jobs.  You  boost in-
comes. And that means greater demand-not only for manufactured goods, but for 
foodstuffs as well. 
There is,  indeed,  hard  evidence to  support this  view.  It is  provided in  Or Kym 
Anderson's paper being presented at this symposium. I would like to mention a few 
of the points raised by  him. 
He says that between the periods 1961-64 and 1980-83 there were overall annual 
increases of 3.3070  in grain production and 2.5070  in meat and milk production in the 
developing economies. But the interesting thing is  that their total food consumption 
rose by  3.5  0J0  a year. 
He goes on to use China as a fascinating case study of how this kind of change has 
taken place. Despite an increase of over 50070  in farm production in the 6 years from 
1978 to 1984, the country's self-sufficiency actually declined during the same period. 
In fact agricultural imports rose a massive sevenfold between  1970-72 and 1982-84. 
If one extends  these  trends  into  the  future,  it  is  obvious  they  have  enormous 
implications for our future potential trade patterns. There is  an important message 
here for  today's policymakers. 
Of course our contributions to international agricultural research do not only help 
in boosting demand for our products overseas. They also provide our scientists with 
information which is valuable in raising the efficiency of our own farm production. I 
will  use the example of our contribution to  Thailand's  mungbean research as  an 
illustration.  Incidentally, CSIRO is  involved in this particular program. 
Mungbeans, to place them in context, are a new  and expanding crop in  northern 
Australia, while in Thailand they are one of considerable antiquity. In assisting the 
Thais, our scientists are providing the benefit of their expertise in  disciplines  like 
physiology, pathology and plant genetics. But the Thais have the advantage of years 
and  years  of practical  experience with  the crop.  They also  have  access  to  a  wide 
variety of germplasm which is  of great potential value to us. 
The net result is  that our infant mungbean industry is  likely to gain considerably 
from interaction between Thailand's researchers and our own. We can give them the 
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farm production. 
And there is an interesting aside about the crop in case you think it just a quaint-
sounding health food. In Asia one of the uses of mungbeans is  as a source of top 
quality starch for making noodles. This high value product is added to cheaper cereal 
starch to enhance its flavour and texture. That could make mungbean starch just the 
sort of value-added product Australian agriculture is looking for to boost its export 
earnings. 
Another crop Australia is involved with in collaborative research with the Thais is 
soybeans. Again, we stand to gain from joint research. And once more there is scope 
for us to exploit specialist markets in Asia. Both soybeans and mungbeans are widely 
used in confections in Japan, for instance. Soybeans alone are made into 35 different 
products-surely another value-added marketing opportunity. 
Anyone who is still worried about us helping with research in developing countries 
should perhaps remember that we do have one advantage that we cannot give away. 
Ours are the benefits of large-scale, mechanised agriculture. As countries develop, so 
their  labour  costs  climb.  But  those  with  a  long  history  of small-scale  intensive 
farming  cannot readily  switch  to  the  sort of broad-acre agriculture which  is  our 
heritage. It has been suggested this  us a cost advantage whieh should become 
increasingly evident as countries to the north ascend the economic ladder. 
Of course there is  one benefit of international research which scientists find hard 
to quantify-but many would probably argue is the biggest benefit of all.  I refer, of 
course, to goodwill. Australia is viewed by many developing nations as a friend, and 
our scientists are playing an important role in helping foster that image. It is one we 
will not regret in an increasingly competitive trade environment. 
In sponsoring and organising this symposium, AClAR has brought together well-
informed speakers on a topic of considerable significance to the future of Australia, 
as well  as the developing countries with which we are collaborating in the scientific 
field.  I  am  sure  there  will  be  much  in  what  the  speakers  have  to  say  and  the 
discussions that follow  to help clarify Australia's objectives and priorities in  inter-
national research in the years ahead. 
This symposium should also assist in examining the rationale for public support 
for agricultural research in  developing countries. It is  highly appropriate at a time 
when funds are in  short supply for research at home. 
8 Impact of Agricultural Research in 
Developing Countries 
Jock R.  Anderson* 
Abstract 
Agriculture continues to  be  a  significant  force  in  the economic growth  of most  developing 
countries. This role is  greatly enhanced through innovations emerging from  national agricul-
tural  research  systems  and  their  international  partners,  including  particularly  the  centres 
supported by  the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. The most spec-
tacular impact of this  research  was  the so-called  Green  Revolution of the  1960s.  Although 
targetted at developing countries, this plant breeding work also resulted in considerable benefit 
to industrial nations such as Australia-notably new cultivars of wheat now widely used by the 
Australian wheat industry. Agricultural research is, of course, much more than the production 
of crop cultivars and other products.  We  also see  improved agricultural products, enhanced 
human  capital,  and  more effective  institutions serving agriculture.  Although  investment  in 
research may be inherently risky, and may involve long delays before benefits are realised, there 
is  mounting  evidence  that  such  investment  in  agricultural  research  provides  returns  that 
compare favourably with those from alternative public investments. 
IN  THE  politics  of agricultural  research  there  is  a 
difficulty in  many  nations  in  identifying effective 
political support. With the fruits of research having 
most  of the  features of a  pure public good, those 
who stand to benefit most may not even know that 
they  are benefiting. Others who may feel  that they 
can  benefit,  even  if only  in  the  short  run  before 
their slower-adopting  fellow  farmers  can catch  up 
and compete away the profits of innovation through 
greater  output and  reduced  prices,  may  see  little 
reward  in  standing up and  being counted.  Special 
pleading by  people in and of the knowledge indus-
tries is  liable to be distrusted and easily disregarded 
as  coming  from  potentially self-serving claimants 
on the public purse. 
We  in  Australia are rather more fortunate in this 
regard.  Visionary  politicians,  public  servants  and 
scholars-these  categories  not  being  mutually 
exclusive-gradually put  in  place  during this  cen-
tury an institutional infrastructure for research that 
has served the nation well.  Earlier 'battlers' such as 
William Farrer had a harder time of it, but did their 
bit  for easing the task of the visionaries. 
* Department  of  Agricultural  Economics  and  Business 
Management,  University  of  New  England,  Armidale, 
N.S.W., Australia. 
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For  agricultural  research  in  particular,  farmers 
too  have  played  a  significant  role  in  articulating 
demand  for  public involvement in  research,  in  in-
vesting  in  such  formal  research  through  industry 
organisations, and by engaging in continuing inven-
tive activity themselves. 
Thus the case for agricultural research as a wor-
thy  public  and  private  investment  has  long  since 
been made, and the major battles fought and, not-
withstanding  some  recent  blips,  seemingly  won. 
Why  then  should  we  be  considering  today  these 
same issues from a perspective of international de-
velopment?  It seems that,  in  the spartan environ-
ment  exemplified  by  recent  Australian  budgetary 
decisions,  responsible investors need  to  review  the 
situation, to consider any fresh evidence, and to be 
reassured that a 'good thing' when done in Austra-
lia  is,  from  Australia's  perspective,  also  a  'good 
thing' in  and for the developing world. 
Research, Agriculture and 
Economic Growth 
Economists  are  not  especially  well  known  for 
harmony  of  thought  but,  in  fact,  are  now  well 
agreed on the importance of a healthy agriculture in 
the  economic  growth  of agrarian  societies  strug-
gling  to  modernise and  industrialise (for  a  recent review  see  Throsby 1986).  Kym  Anderson's paper 
(this volume) elaborates on this  from  a  trade per-
spective.  Further, observers from  many disciplines 
perceive that a healthy agriculture depends, among 
many  factors,  on  cost-reducing  technological 
change that, in turn, is fostered through an effective 
system  of agricultural  research  and  technology  I 
information transfer. This is even true for Australia 
where agriculture now  plays a  rather  minor (one-
twentieth  of gross  domestic  product)  role  in  the 
economy-of course, much greater in 
a role that is supported by an elaborate complex of 
research organisations. The complex is  still evolv-
ing,  as witnessed by  the recent establishment of a 
Bureau of Rural Scienee. The role of agriculture as 
a powerful engine of growth is naturally even more 
important in economies with dominant agricultural 
sectors, but with often weak research and extension 
systems  (e.g.  Johnston and  Melior  1961;  Schultz 
1964; Melior 1985)-including some major nations 
such as  China. 
The  knowledge industries  interact  with agricul-
ture  in  complex  ways  with  varying  and  dynamic 
links between many of the elements. Research is the 
process of adding to the body of knowledge. Some 
knowledge is widely applicable and highly transmis-
sible, and thus the research from which it stems can 
be conducted almost anywhere, perhaps most easily 
and effectively in industrial nations such as Austra-
lia.  Other knowledge  is  applicable to  much  more 
specific  circumstances,  such  as  particular  natural 
ecologies,  geographic localities,  or socioeconomic 
conditions, and the relevant  research must necess-
arily  be  conducted  within  such  defined  circum-
stances.  The continuum of situations makes  valid 
generalisations about a desirable degree of specific-
ity in agricultural research virtually impossible, and 
judgment and  must guide  the hand of 
wise investors in  the knowledge industries. Choices 
within  these  indus! ries  are  also  difficult,  ranging 
from enhancing the human capital of the farming 
population  through  improved  elementary  edu-
cation, to pushing the cutting edge of the  formal 
research  system  further  'upstream'  (Le.  placing 
more emphasis on exploiting recent innovations in 
basic sciences, for example genetic engineering and 
biotechnology). 
Horses for Courses 
In spite of these reservations, however, there are a 
few  rather broad generalisations that  can be pro-
posed.  The first  must  be  that as  nations differ in 
their agroclimatic features and development infra-
structures, the 'ideal' research and development (R 
& D) systems vary correspondingly and, abstracting 
from  the difficulties in  measurement that are im-
plicit,  they  may  well  differ  even  more  greatly. 
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Second, within national boundaries, the extent of 
socioeconomic  and  agroccological  diversity  will 
strongly influence the intranational 'ideal' deploy-
ment of research resources. The challenge faced by 
many rather small economies arises from the great 
diversity in these dimensions mismatched by a pau-
city  of resources  with  which  to  pursue  research-
based advances in technology.  Taking  these rather 
uncontroversial  generalisations  together  unfortu-
nately  means  that there  are  no  ready  recipes  for 
identifying the ideal or even a reasonable mix of R 
& D investments. The issue is, nevertheless, signifi-
cant, and deserving of more research to try to pin 
down useful guidelines for all concerned-national 
authorities, international agencies,  and the donor 
community. 
Impact Assessment 
People who muster the wherewith all to assess the 
impact of past investments in agricultural research 
face and, it is to be hoped, address many difficulties 
in measurement-not to  mention grave conceptual 
problems. One is  the 'counter-factual' question of 
what would have happened without the investment 
under consideration.  Would  other agents, perhaps 
in international agencies,  have  done the 'needful' 
sooner or later? Could the nation simply have bor-
rowed  what  was  technologically  feasible  from 
neighbours  or other nations  in  somewhat  similar 
ecologies? Could progressive farmers have come up 
with similar innovations themselves in  a  few  years 
with a little luck? What contributions were made by 
private  entrepreneurs  and  companies  and  what 
might they have been? 
That some  of these  and  the  many  other  such 
questions  cannot  be  answered  very  satisfactorily 
may explain the paucity of studies of the impact of 
agricultural  research on developing countries.  But 
there are several studies from which to draw.  I will 
lean particularly on a 1984-85 impact study which, 
amongst many things,  included  reviews  of earlier 
work. While the primary focus of this investigation 
was  on  the  I  nternational  Agricultural  Research 
Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative Group on In-
ternational Agricultural Research  (CGIAR or CG 
for  short)!,  the perspective taken  was  that of the 
developing  nations  themselves  and  their  own 
national  research  systems.  The  results  are  being 
published in various forms ranging from short sum-
maries (CGIAR 1985a,b), to separate reports (Lip-
ton  with  Longhurst  1985),  to  books  short 
(Anderson et al.  1988)  and long (Anderson et al. 
1987  on microfiche).  For brevity,  only a  few  notes 
can be extracted here. 
Impact of Agricultural Research 
Without question, the big 'achievement' of inter-
national  agricultural  research  with  its  national partners is the profound change in several nations, 
which is often simply referred to as the 'green revo-
lution.' Agricultural research surely played a preem-
inent part in the change. The work was being done 
in  several  parts of the world,  mostly  in  national 
programs with varying forms of assistance through 
effectively  benevolent  foundations,  bilateral  and 
multilateral  arrangements,  including  the  fledgling 
IARCs  and,  never  to  be  overlooked,  innovative 
farmers. 
Disentangling just who did what, and the contri-
butions from  rice and wheat breeding and related 
research  vis-a-vis  the  critical  inputs  from  invest-
ments in irrigation and fertiliser is  challenging in-
deed.  Even  more  impossible  is  imputing  shares 
among  the  many  actors  in  the  research  systems 
noted above.  The story understandably varies as  it 
is told in New York,  New  Delhi, modern Mexico or 
modern China. There is, at any rate, probably little 
return to such analytical decomposition, especially 
in  retrospective  accounting.  The  key  thing  is  that 
the green  revolution did happen and we  must ask 
how  worthy  it  all  was,  and  what  lessons  can  be 
learned for  the future. 
The Green  Revolution in  a Nutshell 
From the Malthusian gloom of the early 1960s, 
the green revolution certainly provided the food to 
support, with  increasing decency,  the growing mil-
lions in  Asia and some densely populated parts of 
Latin  America.  We  found  in  our  impact  study, 
largely  through  the diligence of Dana Dalrymple 
(DalrympIe 1985), that more than half of the deve-
loping world's rice and wheat area is  now sown to 
the semi-dwarf high-yielding varieties  that are the 
f1agbearers of the green revolution. I, for one, can-
I  The IARCs supported by the CGIAR are: CIAT, Centro 
Internacional  de  Agricultura  Tropical  (International 
Center of Tropical Agriculture), Cali, Colombia; CIM-
MYT,  Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y 
Trigo  (International  Maize  and  Wheat  Improvement 
Center),  Mexico  City,  Mexico;  CIP,  Centro  Interna-
cional de la  Papa (International Potato Center), Lima, 
Peru;  IBPGR,  International  Board  for  Plant  Genetic 
Resources, Rome, Italy; ICARDA, International Center 
for  Agricultural  Research  in  the  Dry  Areas,  Aleppo, 
Syria; ICRISAT,  International Crops Research Institute 
for  the  Semi-Arid Tropics,  Hyderabad,  India;  IFPRI, 
International Food Policy Research  Institute. Washing-
ton, D.C., USA; lITA,  International Institute of Trop-
ical Agriculture, Ibadan, Nigeria;  ILCA, International 
Livestock  Center  for  Africa,  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia; 
ILRAD, International Laboratory for Research on Ani-
mal Diseases, Nairobi, Kenya;  IRRI, International Rice 
Research Institute, Manila, Philippines; ISNAR, Inter-
national  Service  for  National  Agricultural  Research, 
The Hague,  Netherlands;  WARDA,  West  Africa  Rice 
Development Association, Monrovia, Liberia. 
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not presume to judge whether the world is a better 
place as a result of this expansion in  human carry-
ing capacity but, if the value of a human life is even 
only a small positive quantity, the numbers involved 
are so huge  that the 'revolution' is  a  monumental 
contemplation  for  all  observers,  especially  those 
with  our material  advantages.  The  distributional 
aspects of the green revolution have received analyt-
ical  attention  from  different  ideological  positions 
and,  predictably,  with  quite  varied  conclusions. 
Some early observers perceived the green revolution 
to  be  very  regressive,  as  larger  scale  farmers 
'creamed off' the advantages of the new technology 
and  demonstrably  disadvantaged  the  later-
adopting,  usually  smaller-scale,  farmers.  The  fate 
of landless labourers tended to be played down in 
the early debates except when they concerned mech-
anisation. 
As the 'revolution' proceeded, and the evidence 
accumulated, the overviews of most such observers 
changed in tone. For one thing,  the adoption pro-
cesses for technologies that, in most situations, are 
essentially  neutral  with  respect  to  size-of-farm, 
steadily  worked  away.  Thus  in  the  major  green-
revolution-success areas, adoption of modern rice, 
wheat,  and increasingly  also  other crops,  is  very 
similar across categories of farm size, and of farm 
ownership  and  tenure.  For  another,  the  linkages 
elsewhere  have  been  increasingly  recognised.  The 
employment  effects  are  an obvious  concern  and, 
while there have been technologically inspired sub-
stitutions of capital  for  unskilled labour in  some 
situations,  by  and large,  the green  revolution  has 
increased the demand  for  farm  labourers of both 
sexes absolutely, on a per unit area basis, and some-
times also on the basis of the share of hired labour. 
Even more significant are the linkage effects, some 
of which  Melior (this volume) covers  in  his  paper, 
whereby the fruits of new  technology and research 
are captured, spent and multiplied around an econ-
omy and beyond,  including increased  demand for 
some  agricultural  imports  from  nations  such  as 
Australia. 
In  summary, the additional rice and wheat pro-
duced in  the irrigated and well  managed  fields  of 
the developing  world  has  fed  many more  people, 
and  fed  them  better,  has  led  to  real  economic 
growth, although typically with little significant in-
crease in income levels. Mass starvation has, by and 
large,  been  relegated  to  history  or  to  those  few 
political hotspots where nasty people choose to al-
low  their subjects to suffer and die-but more on 
this  later  when  I  address  poverty  issues  per  se. 
Somewhat  less  dramatic  progress  has  been  made 
with most other crops, and also with rice and wheat 
in  less  favoured  and  nonirrigated  regions.  Major 
gains have, however, been made in particular places in  maize,  sorghum, pearl millet,  beans and other 
grain legumes, and a few  other food crops. Gener-
ally,  rather less  progress  has  been made on indus-
trial  and  beverage  crops  (exceptions  include 
Malaysia's successes with rubber and oil palm) and 
on livestock,  reflecting  variously  the less  research 
attention given them and their inherent difficulties 
for technological improvement. 
As an aside, it should be noted that Australia can 
stand proudly by the record of its agricultural scien-
tists  who  have  worked  in  these  research  arenas, 
including those who have worked in the IARCs in 
various capacities. Others have had more of a dom-
estic  research orientation yet  have  identifiably as-
sisted  researchers,  farmers  and  eventually 
consumers in developing countries, whether it be in 
the 'eucalyptisation' of the world, improved species 
of tropical  legumes,  better techniques  for  storing 
grains, or the thousands of other useful products of 
Australian research. 
It must also be observed that the flow of products 
has not been all one way. The developing world has, 
in one way or another, supplied us with a diversity 
of germplasm ranging from tropical legumes to ex-
otic trees. The IARCs have also helped us in a very 
direct and practical manner, such as  in facilitating 
development of pigeonpea cropping in Queensland 
(International  Crops  Research  Institute  for  the 
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and the University of 
Queensland).  Perhaps  the  largest  'single'  benefit 
that Australia has received is  genetic material used 
in our wheat breeding. The International :\1aize and 
Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) is  not our 
only  external  supplier of wheat  genes,  but it  has 
been a major source of useful material. Today, not-
withstanding the plight of our wheat industry, some 
500/0  of our wheat area is  grown to cultivars with 
some CIMMYT connection, and the gain attribut-
able to the connection is conservatively worth some 
A$150  million/year  to  Australia  (Brennan  1986). 
This benefit certainly dwarfs our modest contribu-
tion to CIMMYT's operations and also overwhelms 
our  total  contribution  to  the  financing  of  the 
IARCs of rather less than A$IO million/year. Such 
an outcome confuses the notion of altruism in  in-
vestment  by  industrial nations in  international re-
search,  but  Australia  has  probably  been 
exceptionally  fortunate  in  this  regard.  Ironically, 
given the recent parallels drawn between the econ-
omic destinies of our nations, the other major anal-
ogous non-primary-target beneficiary is Argentina! 
To return to the overview of the green revolution, 
it was indeed the major 'event' in global agriculture 
of recent decades, and a persuasive demonstration 
of what can  be  achieved  through  agricultural  re-
search.  There is,  however,  still  a  long  way  to  go. 
Progress will not be fast but we must be prepared to 
assist in  the research work that is  so important in 
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making the world a better place for  the inevitable 
billions of the next century. 
Beyond Modern Cultivars 
It is  all  too simplistic to look at agricultural re-
search,  especially  the  internationally  supported 
work,  as  the  generation  of new  higher  yielding 
('modern') crop varieties. While this has been, and 
continues  to  be,  a  very  important  aspect,  other 
research products may, in  the long run, prove to be 
even  more significant. One of these is  the training 
of young scientists and technicians, especially from 
the  developing  nations.  By  1984,  the  IARCs  had 
given formal training in research methods and crop 
management  to  more  than  14000 people.  These 
people, with their enhanced skills and productivity, 
are  critical  to  future  agricultural  advancement  in 
the Third World. 
The two research products that are most difficult 
to address are policies and institutions. Within the 
CG system,  two  of the younger international cen-
tres  have  primary responsibilities  for  these  prod-
ucts,  but  many  others  are  also  involved.  The 
International  Food  Policy  Researeh  Institute  (IF-
PRI) has, in  its short life, been a major and widely 
appreciated source of independent  research-based 
information  on a  diversity  of issues  surrounding 
such delicate matters as  foodgrain pricing policies, 
food security interventions, and many other issues 
about which developing countries must make 'hard' 
decisions.  It is  arguable that the rewards from co-
gent  policy  research  are  really  huge  and that the 
investment  in  it  appallingly  small.  If the  global 
community had a more informed view of the costly 
consequences of such things as  (a) the agricultural 
protection  and  subsidisation  policies  in  the  First 
World, (b) the heavy-handed controls in the Second 
World, and (c) typically agricultural 'taxation' cum 
urban-biased  cheap-food  policies  in  the  Third 
World (Peterson 1979; Byerlee and Sain 1986), then 
the world might not be  simultaneously 'drowning' 
in  surpluses  generally  yet  suffering  inadequate 
availabilities  elsewhere.  There  are  many  actors  in 
the field of policy research, including several other 
international agencies besides IFPRI and the World 
Bank (e.g.  the  International Institute for  Applied 
Systems Analysis (lIASA), illustrated by the analy-
ses  of Parikh  and  Tims  (1986»,  many  national 
agencies including, closer to home, both the Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics (BAE)  and the Austra-
lian International Development Assistanee  Bureau 
(AIDAB), and a plethora of others (often based in 
universities)  including,  in  the  Australian  context, 
the Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (AClAR). 
The second rather different product that poses 
difficulties  in  measurement and attribution is  the facilitation  of institutional  development.  Again, 
most  of the  IARCs have  necessarily had some in-
volvement  in  developing  institutional capacity for 
research but, in  the past decade, much of this role 
has fallen  formally to the International Service for 
National  Agricultural  Research  (lSNAR).  If you 
believe  in self determination for  nations generally 
and developing economies in particular, you'll take 
no persuading that a  national capacity  for  effec-
tively conducting agricultural research is absolutely 
vital  for  what are essentially, at their present stage 
of development, agrarian nations. But institution-
building is  easier said than done, and there is  still 
much to be done in  this regard in  the Third World, 
notwithstanding  the  noted  achievements  in  the 
training of research personnel by  the IARCs, and 
the universities in the industrial countries. 
A  case  in  point  is  Pakistan  where  the  Consti-
tution makes agriculture a provincial responsibility 
(i.e.  in  four  exceedingly  independent  'national 
states' that jealously guard their rights), while sci-
ence and technology is  a  federal responsibility.  To 
complicate matters  further,  agricultural education 
is  ministerially  differentiated  from  both these  re-
sponsibilities, and results in  the agricultural univer-
sities  essentially  not participating in  research  and 
development activities. This situation of ineffective 
institutional  linkages  is  paralleled  in  many 
nations.  While politically difficult to  address,  the 
impediments  to  progress  must  somehow  be  over-
come with energy and urgency. 
Other Issues 
The tenor of most of the foregoing may be a little 
more upbeat than [ would wish, and it behooves me 
to mention some qualifications. Knowledge gener-
ation  being  an essentially  uncertain  phenomenon 
means that research is, indeed, a risky business and 
it  is  thus  unsurprising  that  the  research  battle-
grounds are  littered  with  decaying corpses.  Inves-
tors need to be understanding of this reality, while 
doing their best to minimise casualties and to max-
imise advance. Again, I find the Australian experi-
ence  generally  encouraging  as  I  observe  the 
track-record  of our  agencies  concerned  with  the 
management of state, federal, and international ag-
ricultural research. 
Many of the national agricultural  research sys-
tems that must in due course do most  of the work 
are profoundly weak, and can benefit greatly from 
effective external assistance. We know that multilat-
eral assistance, especially through the CG Centres, 
is very effective in this regard. It is also remarkably 
effective in  some possibly unexpected ways.  There 
seems to be a significant 'research multiplier' effect 
at work  whereby any given investment in research 
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on a major food crop in a developing nation by an 
IARC is,  on  average,  more than matched by  the 
nation itself from its own resources (Evenson 1987). 
We  have  also seen  that bilateral  assistance,  de-
spite its often political orientation, can be effective, 
but comes  up against a  severe  impediment in the 
form of a  time-bound project  orientation  and its 
implicit  discontinuities  that augur poorly for  the 
long-term institutional support that is  necessary for 
agricultural research.  I know that is  is  difficult for 
aid  agencies  to  enter  into  long-run  commitments 
while  they  must grapple  with  changing  priorities 
and opportunities, and not always with expanding 
resources, but I fear that many significant gains are 
being sacrificed through a lack of sustained follow-
up.  My  suggested  generalisation  is  that,  if a  re-
search and development project was worth doing as 
a phase-one effort, it is probably even more worth-
while as a long-term collaborative endeavour. 
Let  me  indulge  in  a  university-oriented  illus-
tration of what I could describe as aid/benevolence 
short-sightedness.  Australia  has  supported  many 
students from the developing world in a commend-
ably generous and supportive manner. My own De-
partment presently has about 60 such scholars. But, 
as they are eventually repatriated, the process offi-
cially comes to a halt. There may be some lingering 
contact  through  correspondence  between  teacher 
and student or occasional meetings at conferences. 
The  university  alumnus  associations  try  to  keep 
track  of who's  where  but,  due  to  a  lack  of re-
sources, are not too impressive in their efficiency or 
effectiveness.  I  would  like  to  see  some  resources 
deliberately devoted to  sustaining contact between 
selected AIDAB awardees and their Australian uni-
versity  departments.  A  criterion  in  the  selection 
would be the extent of the awardee's involvement in 
research, and the pereeived complementarity of re-
search interests on both sides. The resources could 
go in  large measure to sponsoring travel  for awar-
dees back to their Australian university as visiting 
scholars, and for Australian academic staff to visit 
and collaboratively work  in  'sister' institutions in 
which  the  awardees  work.  Clearly,  the  adminis-
tration of all this would  be awkward  but the ben-
efits,  both  politically  and  economically,  are 
potentially great. The same arguments, of course, 
also apply to any form of aid, especially those with 
a  human-capital  building  component  (which  is 
most of it), but the administrative problems of fol-
lowing  up on projects that don't have  the 'institu-
tional memory' of universities must be daunting. 
Let me note one final but important qualification 
before  I attempt to  conclude this  brief survey.  In 
spite of my  enthusiasm for the social  benefits that 
can  derive  from  investments  in  agricultural  re-
search, I should stress the obvious point that it is by no means a global panacea. Many serious social ills 
are virtually  untouched  by  successful  agricultural 
research and, insofar as they relate to the subject of 
this  symposium,  most  of these  are  closely  con-
nected to absolute poverty. Household food insecu-
rity is a classic ill  that usually depends directly on 
an insufficiency of resources (induding human cap-
ital) under the command of the household, or what 
Sen  (1981)  describes  as  inadequate  'entitlements: 
Technological progress in agriculture is a very blunt 
instrument for addressing the nutritional and other 
deprivations  associated  with  poverty,  and  clearly 
investments in and policies concerning many things 
beyond  research are required for  broad social  ad-
vancement  in  the developing  world,  including the 
nutritional  relief of the  half-billion  or so  people 
who are seriously undernourished. 
Conclusion 
The  temptation  to  be  complacent  about  world 
food supplies from the vista of surplus grain moun-
tains is understandable, but must be resisted. Feed-
ing  the  world  in  2050  and beyond  will  require  a 
continuing  succession  of  productivity-enhancing 
changes that can only come through research, and 
all  that goes  with  it.  In  conjunction with  further 
investments  in  irrigation,  agricultural  chemical 
manufacturing  capacity  and  other  essential  el-
ements  of modern  agriculture  infrastructure,  re-
search will continue to play its critical role. 
As  always,  investors will  need to be  patient, es-
pecially because the 'easy' gains have already been 
made. Growing concerns for environment and sus-
tainability  problems  in  agriculture  (e.g.  Schuh 
1987)  mean that the research agenda must grow  in 
scope,  complexity and challenge.  The more diffi-
cult  and diverse environments where technological 
advance is  so sorely needed imply even  longer lags 
than the  'normal'  10  to  20  years  that pass before 
significant impact can be realised from an accumu-
lated investment in agricultural research. Australia 
has  a  compelling  moral  duty  to  apply  its  pro-
fessional  expertise and, rather than entertain cut-
backs of the recent kind, to devote a larger share of 
its considerable (albeit declining) wealth to further-
ing  the  welfare  of humanity  through  this  proven 
means to progress in  the developing world. 
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LET me say at the outset that while a number of issues relating to the Anderson paper 
can be raised, finding acceptable answers to the problems flowing from such issues is 
no easy  task.  I  accept the conventional wisdom  amongst  people concerned  with 
development, especially agricultural development, that agricultural systems that are 
based on traditional knowledge stocks are unlikely to provide the surpluses which are 
required  for  economic  development.  The  need  to  switch  from  such  traditional 
systems to science-based systems is  by  now well  established. The linkages between 
agricultural  research  and  the flow  of innovations  which  will  lead  to  agricultural 
growth  in  the first instance-and economic growth consequentially-need no em-
phasis to the people attending this Symposium. Having said that, however, there are 
a number of policy issues-and this is  after all a policy symposium-which can be 
raised in the context of the Anderson paper. 
The paper starts with the proposition that agricultural research lacks a political 
constituency.  While  that proposition may  be  true  for  basic  food  crops,  it  is  not 
necessarily true for a number of export crops. One has only to cite the funding of 
agricultural research by  levies on growers for a number of export tree crops. These 
funds,  which  are often matched by  a  government  contribution, suggest that with 
respect to the export tree crops such a constituency does exist. We have the examples 
of funded coffee research in Colombia and Kenya, cocoa research in Brazil, sugar in 
Mauritius,  rubber  and palm  oil  in  Malaysia,  and copra  research  in  Papua  New 
Guinea to suggest that the proposition may need to be qualified. In the context of the 
International Agricultural Research Centres, it is  understandable that a constituency 
may not exist, primarily because the international centres are in the main concerned 
with the basic  food  crops,  the exceptions  being the two  livestock centres and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. The benefits of agricultural research in 
the basic food crops are often diffused widely amongst the community, and are not 
so obvious to the general public as is the case for exporters, so the basis for a political 
constituency is  also diffuse. 
There is  still a policy issue relating to the quantum of resources to be devoted to 
agricultural research and the distribution of whatever resources  are available over 
private and publicly funded research. One may also question the statement in the 
paper that the battles for agricultural research have been 'fought and seemingly won.' 
I believe that the battle is  still on, and the fact that this Symposium is  held in the 
Headquarters of CSIRO would lend weight to the proposition that the struggle for 
resources,  particularly  for  agricultural  research,  is  an ongoing one.  That view  is 
reinforced by a recent document from the Department of Industry, Technology and 
Commerce that seems to take a jaundiced view of the role of Australian agriculture. 
Amongst the many statements arguing for more resources for R&D in  manufactur-
ing  is  one  which  reads:  'the decline  in  world  demand  for  Australia's  traditional 
agriculture and mineral export commodities now seems likely to be medium- to long-
term duration.' This policy statement hardly seems to square with the view that 'V-
Day' has arrived for agricultural research. 
• Department of Economics, University of Adelaide, North Terrace, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia. 
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to  agricultural  research,  there  is  the  problem  of the  allocation  of public  funds 
between agricultural research that is  directed  at Australian agricultural problems, 
and research that is  directed at overseas agricultural problems,  partieularly in  the 
developing countries. The concern manifests itself in a general view that if  the budget 
for  overseas  agricultural  research  grows  then  it  will  often  be  at the expense  of 
research aimed at solving Australia's problems. Thcre is  little doubt that although 
Australia benefits from research done overseas, which has application in  Australian 
agriculture, it is also arguable that the feedback to Australian agriculture of research 
funded by Australian taxpayers, but directed at overseas agriculture, may be limited. 
The eommodity mix  is  different and the location-specificity of much agricultural 
research, particularly on the biological side, might suggest that, if we were taking the 
view  that public funds  should be  directed at  increasing welfare  in Australia, then 
preferenee should go  to research  projects  which  have  relatively  little  spill over  to 
overseas countries. Admittedly this is  a partial view  and Kym  Anderson's paper at 
this Symposium takes a more general equilibrium view  of the potential benefits in 
second  round  effects  of the  gains  to  Australia  of funding  research  directed  at 
overseas countries. 
Once the quantum of resources  has  been decided on, and the publicly  funded 
component of it  is  known,  there are  a  number of consequential issues  to  be  ad-
dressed. The first of these is the institutional format in  which the research is  to be 
conducted.  The possible institutions  are  universities,  departments of agriculture, 
separate research institutes at the national level, and research institutes established at 
the international level. I believe that the early success of CIMMYT and IRRI resulted 
in  a proliferation of that institutional model  without consideration of alternative 
models which might have been more appropriate in particular developing countries. 
For example, the French in their overseas agricultural research maintain a mu  eh more 
highly centralised research system with the laboratories based in France, rather than 
in the developing countries in  francophone Africa. 
The question of the size of the international agricultural research units is  also a 
matter for  debate.  The notion of 'minimal critical mass'  was  used  as a  basis  for 
arguing that the developing countries could not mount such a critical mass. Measure-
ment of the mass was often very difficult but it was often argued that one had to have 
an international centre to mount the necessary critical mass. The early achievements 
of both IRRI and CIMMYT, in the Green Revolution context, were  obtained with 
relatively small core budgets, primarily because the results from the research centres 
were  pervasive in  nature.  In particular, the lack of sensitivity to day-length meant 
that the new  varieties  of wheat could slot  into  an environmental  niche  in  many 
countries of the world. As the international centres became subject to pressures to 
improve on the results they had already achieved-pressures which  mounted as  the 
donors wanted more results-the centres engaged in an out  reach program. While this 
undoubtedly  helped  strengthen  many  weak  national  agricultural  systems  in  the 
developing countries, the size of the budget increased materially. 
The decision where to locate a centre is  also an interesting issue and in  a sense 
depends on the scientific charter of the international centre. The decision to locate 
ICRISAT in  India with  the commodity orientation directed to  chickpeas, pigeon 
peas, sorghum, millet and groundnuts, has meant that India will  be the major early 
beneficiary  of any  innovations  which  originate  from  the  centre.  Since  there  is 
substantial evidence that new innovations are first adopted in the areas immediately 
around the centre, and since India has some 90070  of chickpea production and some 
35070  of sorghum production in the semi-arid tropics, then both the location and the 
commodity  mix  will  benefit  Indian  agriculture  in  the  first  instance.  There  is  a 
question at what stage should the host countries take more of the burden to free up 
resources for other even poorer areas. However one cannot avoid the comment that 
scientific institutions once created have a long half-life and go on and on and on. 
The international centres'  budgets can be  broken down into research,  extension 
and training  and one question  that must  arise  is  the proportion of that budget 
16 devoted to training of scientists for national research institutes.  Some years  ago  I 
looked at the nationality of fellowship holders in CIMMYT and IRRI and concluded 
that the majority of such  fellows  tended  to  come  from  the  developed  countries 
themselves.  Therefore one might well  have  said so  far  as  Australian scientists are 
concerned that Australia was  doing well  by  doing good. 
I  was  delighted to see the reference to location-specificity in Anderson's paper, a 
specificity  which  arises  both  from  agroclimatic  factors  and  from  socioeconomic 
factors.  I have for a number of years argued that such location-specificity, particu-
larly for biological innovations, means that there will  have to be a strengthening of 
the national agricultural systems and more adaptive work in the recipient countries 
of innovations originating from the centres. However, location-specificity does have 
implications for research priorities at the international agricultural research centres. 
Does it mean, for instance, that the international centres should move more towards 
the basic science end of the research  spectrum where new  knowledge may have  a 
potentially pervasive influence on agricultural innovations, rather than concentrating 
on farming systems, which tend to  be location-specific. 
The last comment that I have to make is in the context of what appears to be the 
simple goal of increasing food production, a goal which the author emphasises in his 
treatment of the Green  Revolution as the crown jewel of the international agricul-
tural research centres. I am convinced that many donors to the international centres 
regard increased food production as a non-contentious objective and that any aid for 
scientific research directed  at such  an objective is  an apolitical activity.  Sen*,  for 
instance, has argued that the study of famines is  a more complex issue than simply 
the non-availability of food. So far as scientific truths are concerned, while they may 
be apolitical at source, their application in the agricultural science field is to alter the 
mix  of inputs,  to  change  the  mix  of outputs,  to  alter  competitive  relationships 
between countries (rice importers become rice exporters), to affect the balance of 
payments and to alter the level and structure of domestic economic activity.  More-
over,  they  often have  the consequences of altering  personal relationships between 
landlords, tenants,  landless agricultural labourers  and the  relative  returns to men 
versus  women. Such perturbations arising  from  the application of scientific prin-
ciples to agricultural innovations hardly seem to merit the adjective apolitical. 
* Sen, A. K.  1981. Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Clarendon 
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18 'nks Between Technology, Agricultural 
Development, Economic Growth and 
Trade  Creation 
John W.  Mellor* 
Abstract 
This paper presents the argument that, for the most part, the recent successes in  development in 
the Third World are a consequence of growth in  the agricultural sector and that, to  build on 
those  successes,  it  is  necessary  to  further  promote growth  through  increased  investment  in 
agricultural technology. It is  argued that technological change, and the agricultural research 
systems that lie behind it, increases the income of farmers and, consequently, their demand for 
labour-intensive, nonagricultural commodities. The poor, who spend a large part of incremen-
tal  income on  food,  respond  to the  resulting  increase  in  their  employment and  purchasing 
power by increasing their demand for food. The link between employment and food demand is 
shown to cause a significant increase in the demand for food imports in  developing countries. 
This increase in  imports from greater employment of the poor highlights the mutual benefits of 
agricultural growth in  the Third World  to both developing countries and developed countries 
which export basic food staples. 
Introduction 
THE  dramatic turnaround in  many countries from 
food  deficits in the  1970s  to  food  surpluses in  the 
1980s  is  evidence  of  the  tremendous  success  in 
world  agriculture  in  recent  years.  Global  cereal 
stocks  in  the  mid-1980s  are  now  almost twice  as 
large as in the mid-1970s. In 1985, real world cereal 
prices were down 300,70  from  1981, compared to an 
almost twofold increase between 1972 and 1974. At 
no time have  the prospects for  feeding  the world's 
poor been so encouraging. 
In recent years, there have been many successes in 
agriculture in  developing countries as  well.  During 
the  period  1961  to  1983,  developing  country pro-
duction  of major  food  crops  grew  at  an  average 
annual rate of 2.7% and consumption at an even 
faster rate of 30,70,  compared to a population growth 
rate of 2.50,70. 
•  International Food Policy Research Institute, 1776 Mas-
sachusetts  Avenue,  N.W.,  Washington,  D.e.  20036, 
USA. 
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Yet,  in  spite  of those successes,  in  spite of the 
abundance of food in the world, many countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America still face food defi-
cits, not surpluses. More to the point, hunger and 
malnutrition  continue to  affect  the  lives  of from 
one~half to one billion people in  the Third World. 
Given the abundance of food in·some areas, par-
ticularly the developed countries, it might be tempt-
ing to suggest food trade alone as an answer to the 
world's continuing food  problems.  Shipping  food 
from more developed surplus countries to still deve-
loping, deficit countries might seem to represent the 
easiest solution to the world's food problem. 
However, the world food problem is not merely a 
physical distribution problem. More importantly, it 
is  a  problem  of  the  distinct  lack  of  purchasing 
power among the poor in many Third World coun-
tries. The poor in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
now lack the means to buy more food at any price. 
Redistribution  of  global  food  supplies  through 
trade is,  thus, an incomplete solution to the world 
food  problem.  Food  trade between  the developed 
and developing countries must be coupled with  ef-forts to raise the purchasing power of low-income 
people throughout the Third World. 
This  paper  explores  the  links  between  poverty, 
agricultural development and commercial trade be-
tween developing and developed countries. Two  in-
terrelated themes will be discussed. The first is that 
in low-income countries, development, agriculture 
and research are inextricably intertwined. The sec-
ond is  that it  is  in the best interests of developed 
countries  that are  major exporters of agricultural 
commodities  to  form  a  partnership  with  low-
income  countries  to  promote the  latter's  agricul-
tural development. 
Toward  a Successful Development Strategy 
Any successful development strategy in the Third 
World should seek to increase the purchasing power 
of the  poor.  Necessary  to  this  task  is  to  create 
employment opportunities for the poor. In the past, 
two  basic  strategies  have  been put forward:  (1)  a 
capital-intensive  strategy  promoting  rapid  indus-
trialisation as the source of overall growth; and (2) 
an  agricultural-oriented  strategy  which  stresses 
growth in rural, labour-intensive sectors as the pri-
mary engine of overall economic growth. 
In general, capital-intensive strategies of develop-
ment,  exemplified  by  India's  Second  Five-Year 
Plan, do not lead to significant increases in employ-
ment.  Instead,  these  strategies  concentrate  re-
sources in  large-scale industries, such as  steel and 
heavy machinery, that are intended, but in practice 
fail,  to  maximise capital  formation and economic 
growth. Capital-intensive strategies try to minimise 
employment in  the short run to prevent  increased 
consumption  of wage  (consumer)  goods  and  the 
consequent diversion of resources away from high-
growth capital goods production. Increases in  em-
ployment are seen only as long-run consequences of 
the massive growth in capital. Because the supply of 
capital goods is  believed  to  be  the  principal con-
straint  to development,  little  need  is  seen  for  in-
creasing agricultural production. 
However, as employment grows and the purchas-
ing power of the poor increases, they tend to spend 
a substantial part of that increased income on food. 
Elasticities of expenditure on food run as  high  as 
0.62 to  1.06  for  the poor in  developing  countries 
(Table  1).  This increased  demand from growth  in 
employment of the poor requires greater supplies of 
food. If  the role of food is neglected in the develop-
ment  process,  increased  prices  will  effectively  re-
duce the real incomes of the poor and increase the 
real cost of labour. The supply of food is, therefore, 
a critical constraint to sustained growth in employ-
ment. 
An agricultural strategy of development, on the 
other  hand,  promotes  employment  and  increases 
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Table  1  Food expenditure elasticities for low-income' 
families (source, Alderman  1986). 
Country  IRegion  Urban  Rural 
Sri Lanka  0.72  0.86 
Thailand  0.62  0.65 
Egypt  0.71  0.68 
Sudan  0.74  0.84 
Indonesia  0.88  0.98 
Nigeria 
Funtua  n.a.  0.89 
Gusau  n.a.  1.04 
Malaysia 
Muda  n.a.  0.88 
Brazil  0.83  0.83 
Bangladesh  1.06  1.06 
•  Low  income is  defined as  the  average income of families  that 
consume 1750-2000 calories per capita per day. 
the purchasing power of the poor through an em-
phasis on the production of labour-intensive wage 
goods, particularly food. Such a development strat-
egy  emphasises  the  widespread  dissemination  of 
yield-increasing  technological  change  in  agricul-
ture.  The sheer  size  of the  agricultural  sector  in 
most developing countries, accounting for 40-80070 
of employment,  ensures  that  technical  change in 
that sector will have important macroeconomic im-
plications. Increased agricultural production boosts 
domestic  food  supplies  at  the  same  time  that  it 
stimulates further rounds of employment growth in 
the service and urban sectors of the economy.  Be-
cause of its output and employment linkage effects 
with  the rest  of the economy,  agricultural growth 
helps  raise  access  to  food  supplies  for  both  the 
urban and rural poor. 
Impact of Technological Change 
To  grossly  oversimplify  a  complex  issue,  the 
proper  stimulus  to  increased  agricultural  pro-
duction is  improved agricultural technology which 
results in increasing factor productivity. These pro-
ductivity gains provide a combination of increased 
profits to landowners, increased demand for labour 
and consumer benefits from lower  prices.  Growth 
of this  kind  produces  a  net  increase  in  national 
income that serves as an important engine for driv-
ing the rest of the economy. 
Higher  prices,  on  the  other  hand,  produce 
growth with decreasing factor productivity (due to 
classic  diminishing  returns),  resulting  in  less  and 
less  output  for  additional  levels  of  inputs.  Of 
course, prices must be at profitable levels  for  the 
technology to be applied, and if governments have 
dictated  prices  downward  they  may  well  need  to reconsider such practices if technological change is 
to be fully effective. 
In fact, in the past two decades higher crop yields 
from  improved technology have  become the main 
source of food production growth in the developing 
world.  Between  1961  and 1980 output per hectare 
of major food crops in the developing world rose by 
1.91l10  annually and accounted for more than 70% 
of total  food  production growth.  Increases in  har-
vested area, which averaged only 0.7% a year,  con-
tributed the other 30OJo  of total production growth 
in the Third World (Paulino 1986). 
The direct effect of technological change in agri-
culture is an increase in the incomes of landowning 
farmers. These farmers typically spend a large pro-
portion of their new incomes on locally produeed 
nonagricultural goods and services such as  textil; 
products,  transportation  and health  services,  and 
housing. Production of these goods tends to be far 
more labour-intensive than in  large-scale industry. 
As a result of the increased incomes of landowning 
farmers,  the  rural  poor are provided  with  a  wide 
range of new,  nonagricultural employment oppor-
tunities. 
The more far-reaching implications of increased 
agricultural produetion are the results of increased 
employment of the poor. Greater employment pro-
vides  greater income, and effectively  increases the 
poor's purchasing power,  providing access to more 
food. The resulting increased demand for food and 
other nonagricultural goods provides  strong,  indi-
rect multiplier effects  which stimulate new  rounds 
of growth in the economy as  a whole.  Inexpensive 
food  from  increased production helps  keep  labour 
costs  down  and,  thus,  encourages  employment 
growth  in the urban sectors of the economy.  The 
result is  a general increase in domestic demand for 
labour-intensive consumer goods. 
Another favourable result of agricultural growth 
is  the  increase  in  foreign  exehange  earnings  ob-
tained  both  through  increased  production of ex-
portable agricultural commodities and the growth 
In those labour-intensive industries in which deve-
loping countries possess a comparative advantage. 
Taiwan is  a good example of a country which used 
an agricultural-oriented strategy of development to 
create small-scale manufacturing and industrial en-
terprises that could compete on the world market. 
Of course,  necessary to  this process of agricul-
tural development is the concurrent development of 
rural infrastructure.  In many developing  countries 
new rural roads, drainage systems and delivery sys-
tems  are  sorely  needed.  It is  essential  to provide 
farmers  with  access  to irrigation and other inputs 
necessary for  use with new technology and to pro-
vide them with access to markets for their increased 
output. 
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Food Imports and 
Stages of Development 
The initial stages of development are marked by 
extreme  poverty,  high  death  rates  and,  therefore, 
low  rates  of population growth.  The effective de-
m~nd for food at these levels of income and popu-
latIOn grows  slowly,  at a rate that can be met with 
more effort on a slightly expanded land base. 
Later,  as  development  occurs,  the  population 
growth  rate  increases  and,  more  importantly,  in-
come  begins  to  grow  rapidly.  These  two  forces 
combined with the poor's high elasticity of  expendi~ 
ture  on food,  can  produce  a  rate  of increase  in 
effective demand for  food that far exceeds  all  but 
the most rapid rates of food production growth. 
.  Many  countries  in  a  high-growth,  medium-
mcome  stage  of development,  therefore,  find  it 
necessary to rely on food imports to meet a portion 
of their  surging  food  demand.  A  close  look  at 
Figure 1 shows that increasing per capita ineome is 
the  dynamic  factor  underlying  the  surge  in  food 
imports  in  the  Third  World.  Between  1966  and 
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Fig.  1.  Growth  rates  of  population,  staple  food  pro-
duction,  consumption and  imports  in  developing coun-
tries,  1966-80 (adapted from  Melior and  Adams (1986) 
and Paulino (1986)). 1980, in the fastest-growing countries (over 5Ofo  an-
nual increase in GNP per capita), the rate of food 
consumption growth was over twice the rate of food 
production  growth.  Food  imports  increased  at  a 
IOOfo  rate of annual growth for these countries. This 
is  in part due to the inclusion of a number of oil-
exporting countries in this fast-growth category. For 
all developing  countries,  however,  across  all levels 
of GNP growth, food  imports still grew  at an an-
nual rate of 6.3%, while consumption grew at only 
3%. 
Even those countries with a high rate of technical 
progress  in  agriculture might  not  be  able to  meet 
their rates of growth in food demand. For example, 
the  24  countries  with  the  fastest  growth  rates  in 
basic food  staples production between  the periods 
1961-65 and 1979-83 collectively increased their net 
imports of food staples by 419U7o, or by 9.6% annu-
ally.  This level of increase of imports was necessary 
despite a 4.3% average annual growth rate of pro-
duction of food staples (Table 2). 
Finally, in  the later stages of development, popu-
lation growth  rates  decline and growth  in  income 
begins to have little effect on the demand for food. 
Meeting  food  demand  becomes  more manageable 
as  food  production  growth  rates  become  institu-
tionalised at high levels. At this stage, food imports 
become unnecessary and agricultural surpluses be-
gin to accrue. 
Impact of Livestock Production 
on Imports 
As income rises in developing countries, the rela-
tive character of food demand changes.  Rising in-
come  causes  food  demand  to  shift  to  the  more 
preferred cereals and to highly income-elastic live-
stock  products.  The  latter,  in  particular,  become 
Table 2  Net imports of food staples in 24 countries with rapid growth in food staple production (source, FAO 
Production Data, 1961-1983). 
Net food staple imports  Annual growth rate 
(000 t)  (%) 
1961-65  1979-83  Net importsa  Productionb 
Colombia  161  728  681091  8.3  4.2 
Costa Rica  -4422  -53 892  14.9  4.5 
Cuba  947 768  2079589  4.5  4.0 
El Salvador  92146  179499  3.8  4.1 
Guatemala  54837  95041  3.1  3.3 
Indonesia  871  641  I 759489  4  3.8 
Iran  243639  3 332  452  15.6  4.0 
Ivory Coast  54638  487363  12.9  3.4 
Korea,  Dem PR  153  851  215  360  1.9  4.3 
Libya  117219  731  082  10.7  4.2 
Mexico  -374846  5986 181  3.8 
Mongolia  -20 195  95577  3.4 
Pakistan  750483  -342655  4.6 
Paraguay  69  145  58366  -0.9  4.7 
Philippines  656305  934539  2  4.7 
Rwanda  -49  20702  4.2 
Sri Lanka  787420  622612  -1.3  4.6 
Sudan  -232 128  -235756  0.1  3.5 
Surinam  -3621  -60525  16.9  6.4 
Syria  -326635  559 880  3.3 
Tanzania  16408  182457  14.3  4.7 
Thailand  -2 808  116  -10 680 672  7.7  4.3 
Venezuela  589  144  2629 198  8.7  3.3 
Zimbabwe  -57544  -247743  8.4  3.3 
Total  1 738816  9029235  9.6  4.3 
a Calculations based on mid-points of indicated periods. 
b Trend growth  from  regression of the natural logarithm of the annual production values. 
Note: Rapid growth couutries are defined as those with greater than 3.25"70  growth in food production from  1961  to 1983.  Excluded are 
China, because of biases in data in the early 19605. and those countries with an  food production of less than 100000 tlyear from 
1979 to 1983. Although there may be questions regarding the quality of national  in these countries, especially those in Africa, the 
trends reflected by their aggregate annual data on production and trade clearly indicate that net food imports of the group have increased 
much faster than food production. 
22 increasingly  important  in  consumption  patterns. 
Evidence of this fact is the rapidly increasing rate of 
Third World meat consumption: between  1961-65 
and 1973-77 meat consumption in the Third World 
grew at an average annual rate of 3  .40j'0. As a result, 
developing  countries have  been  rapidly expanding 
their imports of livestock products. Between 1961-
65  and 1973-79, imports of meat products to deve-
loping countries have increased by 79% (Sarma and 
Yeung  1985). 
However,  since livestock is  a labour-intensive en-
terprise,  it  is  generally  desirable  for  developing 
countries to displace these meat imports with dom-
estic  production.  Accelerated  growth  of domestic 
livestock  production would, in turn, stimulate the 
demand  for  food  staples  as  feed  for  livestock.  In 
many  high-growth,  medium-income  developing 
countries, growing demand for livestock feed serves 
to accelerate the already high demand for cereals. 
Projections 
Simple trend projections to the year 2000 of basic 
food staples imports, including livestock feed, show 
incremental net imports reaching approximately 40 
million  t. If adjustments are made for  increasing 
feed  to livestock  ratios  from  present levels,  which 
are almost certain to occur, these projections could 
well increase by another 40 million t (Paulino 1986). 
The developing countries are not likely  to  over-
come their dependence on food  imports for  some 
time. A rough guess would place the necessary level 
of per capita income near $3000 before demand for 
imports  would  fall  off.  The  phase  of very  rapid 
growth  in  import demand  from  developing  coun-
tries could last for about 40-50 years. While exports 
from some developing countries, most notably Ar-
gentina  and  Thailand,  have  increased  in  recent 
years,  their  share  in  the  overall  export  market  is 
quite small and will  continue to be so. Therefore, 
the bulk of increased  food imports to developing 
countries  will  have  to  come  from  the  developed 
countries. 
Policy Implications 
These increased imports mark the unity of inter-
est  between  food  exporters  and  those  developing 
countries.  On  the  one  hand,  food  exporters  are 
anxious to sell their products on the world market. 
On the  other hand,  the developing  countries rep-
resent  the  only  remaining  growth  market  in  the 
world for basic food staple exports. To  ensure con-
tinued growth in that market, it is in the interest of 
the  developed  countries  to  nurture  agricultural 
growth in developing countries. To  do so, the fol-
lowing steps should be taken: 
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(1)  Increase the  purchasing power of the poor 
through growth in agricultural production brought 
on by  technical change. This can be accomplished 
only through  increased  investment  in  agricultural 
research and extension in the developing world. 
(2)  Avoid  investment  in  large-scale  capital-
intensive  enterprises  that  drain  agriculture  and 
employment-intensive,  nonagricultural  industries 
of the little  capital they  need  to  increase employ-
ment. Capital-intensive intermediate goods such as 
fertilizer and steel and heavy machinery create little 
domestic employment and can be imported. 
(3)  Increase  investment  in  rural  infrastructure 
concurrently with increased investment in  agricul-
tural research. In many cases, food aid from devel-
oped countries will be necessary to undertake these 
efforts since the employment generated from public 
works  programs  on  rural  infrastructure  increases 
short-term demand for food. 
(4)  Promote  labour-intensive  livestock  pro-
duction in developing countries. The potential in-
crease  in  employment  in  this  sector  is  extremely 
high.  Again,  increased  production of livestock  in 
developing  countries  contributes  substantially  to 
those  countries'  increased  imports  of basic  food 
staples. 
(5)  Promote open markets for  imports of grain 
and exports of labour-intensive industries in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage. 
Conclusion 
Continued  success  in  development  requires  an 
active partnership between the developing and the 
developed world. On the part of developing coun-
tries, the first priority is to recognise t hat increased 
employment  and  increased  demand  for  food  go 
hand in hand. An agricultural-oriented strategy of 
development is  the best way to confront that fact. 
On the part of the developed countries, there must 
be  a  commitment to make available the technical 
and financial resources necessary to insure the suc-
cess of an agricultural strategy of development. The 
result of such success could guarantee an adequate 
level of food  for all the world's poor. 
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Comment on J.  W.  Melior Paper 
Heinz W.  Arndt* 
THIS paper admirably highlights the three propositions that form the core agenda of 
this seminar: 
(1)  Agricultural research can make a major contribution to growth of farm output 
and income in developing countries; 
(2)  Growth  of food  output in  developing countries does not necessarily  reduce 
food imports because in the earlier stages of development both the share of agricul-
ture in  GDP and the income elasticity of demand for food are high; and 
(3)  Therefore, concern among farmers in food-exporting countries, such as Aus-
tralia, about agricultural research aid as a potential threat to their overseas markets is 
misplaced. 
One can only applaud MeIIor's authoritative and forceful statement of these three 
propositions. The fears  he seeks to allay are  one form of protectionist zero-sum-
game thinking which it is  the job of economists to counter. 
There are, however,  two aspects of Melior's argumentation which I do not find 
entirely convincing. 
The first relates to the evidence he advances for the broad proposition that rapid 
growth  of food  production  in  developing  countries  has  in  the  last  two  decades 
increased rather than reduced their food imports.  The statistical evidence is  sum-
marised  in  his  Table  2.  It purports to  show  relatively  high growth rates  of food 
imports for countries which, over the period 1961-83, have reeorded the highest rates 
of growth of food  production. 
The data appear to confirm the correlation mainly for three categories of coun-
tries:  (a)  oil  exporters  (Iran,  Libya,  Mexico,  Venezuela)  which  were  able  to  use 
petrodollars to stimulate both food production and  food imports; (b) 'basic-needs' 
oriented economies (Cuba, Mongolia, Tanzania) which become less self-sufficient in 
food while (if the data can be accepted as reliable) achieving relatively high rates of 
growth of food production; and (c) some small Latin American countries (Colom-
bia, El Salvador, Guatemala). 
Against  this,  there  is  weighty  contrary evidence:  (a) some of the largest  food-
deficit countries of the Third World have, thanks to the Green Revolution, achieved 
virtual self-sufficiency in food; India (not shown because it does not rank as a fast-
growth food producer), Indonesia and the Philippines (which over the years shown 
appears to have experienced increased food imports but which has in fact become, on 
balance, self-sufficient), net importers in some years, net exporters in others; (b) the 
* Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2600, Australia. 
24 USSR and some other Comecon countries (not shown) whose increased dependence 
on food imports largely reflects poor agricultural performance; and (c) some coun-
tries (Thailand, Zimbabwe, Costa Rica) whose apparent high rate of growth of net 
food imports in fact records rapid growth of net food exports (negative net imports). 
It would be foolish to use the table as evidence against John Melior's broad case. 
He is  clearly  right  in  pointing out that agricultural  growth  does  not  necessarily 
reduce food imports. But neither does it necessarily increase them. Much depends on 
what is happening to growth in other sectors of the economy, to income distribution 
and to the commodity structure of agricultural production and trade. 
This leads me straight to my second point, the relevance of Melior's demonstration 
of probable growth of developing country demand  for  food  to the  world  market 
prospects facing Australia's rural industries; for this relevance depends very much on 
the commodity patterns of Australian production and developing country demand. 
Insofar as  Melior's argument refers  to monsoon Asia, and increased developing 
country demand for food imports of rice, it is  largely irrelevant  to  Australia which 
cannot significantly increase rice production (without causing severe salination prob-
lems in irrigation areas). Developing country demand for wheat and sugar could be 
more beneficial to Australia, but for neither commodity are developing countries the 
main importers, and for both world markets seem likely to be depressed by surpluses 
for some time to come. 
Melior emphasises the high income elasticity of demand in middle-income deve-
loping countries for protein foods, such as meat and dairy products, and urges them 
to meet this growing demand by expanding domestic livestock production which has 
the advantage of being highly labour-intensive, thus shifting import demand from 
outputs  (meat,  dairy  products)  to  inputs  (feedstuffs,  especially  cereals).  Such  a 
prescription, it if were followed (which does not in fact seem very likely in Southeast 
Asia where efforts to expand livestock production have not so far been very success-
ful)  would  be  a  lot  more  encouraging  to  the  USA  with  its  huge  potential  for 
additional  cereals  production,  than  for  Australia  which  has  tended  to  think  of 
growing East Asian demand for protein food as one of the most promising potential 
growth markets. It is  also worth mentioning that the Australian industry in  which 
fears  of strengthening potential competition in  export markets through export of 
technology, or aid in research, have been most strongly voiced is  the wool industry, 
rather than any of the food-producing industries. But Melior's argument, of course, 
applies as well to wool. 
Let me conclude by repeating that these somewhat niggling comments are in  no 
way intended to weaken John Mellor's case, with which I entirely agree. 
25 A healthy stand of 7-year-old Casuarina junghuhniana near Bangkok, Thailand, is  part of an 
AClAR-funded forestry project. This research has led to significant productivity gains which in  turn 
enhance the incomes of farmers. 
26 Is Agricultural Growth in Developing Countries 
in  Australia's Interest? 
Kym  Anderson* 
Abstract 
The commonly  held  view  that  agricultural-exporting developed  countries such  as  Australia 
would lose from agricultural growth in less-developed countries (LDCs) is shown to be based on 
an incomplete argument. It considers only the effects on LDC agricultural supply, or at best 
only that and the first-round effects of increased farmer incomes on the demand for tradables. 
What also needs to be considered is  the effect on the demand for nontradables and hence the 
second-round  effects  of increased  spending  by  producers of nontradables.  When  all  these 
effects are considered, the positive correlations obtained between agricultural output growth in 
LDCs and agricultural imports from developed countries is not surprising. It is then shown that 
selling or giving away agricultural research and management skills to developing countries can 
be beneficial to Australia even  from  a narrow economic perspective. 
SINCE the 1960s developing countries have provided 
the fastest-growing markets for Australia's farm ex-
ports. It is therefore understandable that farmers in 
Australia are concerned, at this time of extraordi-
narily  low  export  prices,  about rapid  agricultural 
growth  in  developing  countries.  They  see  this  as 
reducing developing countries' imports or expand-
ing their exports of food and fibre, thereby lowering 
Australia's  export  earnings.  Indeed  farmers  may 
well  feel  that part of the reason  for  the currently 
depressed prices in international food markets is the 
success of scientists in  boosting crop yields  in  the 
tropics. As a result, they and others are questioning 
the  wisdom  of selling-or,  worse  still,  of giving 
away  in  the form of foreign aid via the Australian 
International  Development  Assistance  Bureau 
(AIDAB)  and  the  Australian  Centre  for  Inter-
national  Agricultural  Research  (ACIAR)-
Australia's  agricultural  research  and  management 
skills,  genetic  material  from  livestock  studs,  and 
similar perceived sources of Australia's agricultural 
comparative advantage. 
My task is to address the question of whether this 
* Department  of  Economics,  University  of  Adelaide, 
Adelaide, S.A. 5001, Australia. 
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conventional  view-that  agricultural  growth  in 
developing  countries  is  against  Australia's  econ-
omic interests-is a reasonable one. It turns out not 
to be supported by empirical evidence; in  fact there 
appears to be a strong positive correlation between 
agricultural  growth  in  developing  countries  and 
their imports from Australia. The reason has to do 
with  some important demand considerations  that 
are omitted from the conventional argument which 
focuses  only  on agricultural supply  in  developing 
countries.  When  these  are  taken  into  account,  it 
becomes easier to see why it may well  be in Austra-
lia's interest to promote agricultural growth in deve-
loping  countries  (see  Anderson  (1987)  for  more 
details). 
Is There Empirical Support for 
the Conventional View? 
The common presumption is  that if food output 
expands in  a developing country then that country 
will  reduce  its  imports  or  expand  its  exports  of 
food.  If the country is  a large participant in  world 
food markets, or if this happens in enough develop-
ing  countries,  then  international  food  prices  will 
fall.  For both reasons-reduced  net imports and a 
possible  fall  in  the  international price-countries like  Australia could expect  to  reduce  their export 
earnings, so the argument goes. 
There is  some concern among our farmers  that 
part of the reason real international food prices are 
at extraordinarily low levels at present (see Fig.  I) is 








1900  1920  1940  1960  1980 
Fig.  1.  Real international food  prices for  Australian ex-
ports,  1900  to  1987.  (An  index  of export  prices  in  US 
dollars for cereals, meats, dairy products and sugar, de-
flated by the US producer price index, with weights based 
on the importance of each commodity in Australian pro-
duction in  1977-79.  The  1987  value is  based on World 
Bank projections.) (1977-79  100). Source: Compiled by 
the author using price series from the World Bank's Econ-
omic Analysis and Projections Department. 
expanding  their  food  output.  And  there is  some 
basis  for  that  concern:  large  countries  such  as 
China, India and Indonesia have been very success-
ful  in  raising their production of staple foods, and 
developing countries as a group have expanded their 
total  food  output since  the  19605  at  a  pace  500/0 
faster than that of industrial countries. 
However,  in  developing  economies  the demand 
for  food  has  grown  even  more  rapidly  than  the 
supply.  In  fact,  food  consumption  has  grown  at 
more than twice the pace of food consumption in 
industrial  market  economies  (Fig.  2),  because  of 
faster  population growth and faster  growth in  per 
capita  income  (Table  1).  As  a  result,  food  self-
sufficiency  has  declined  in  developing  economies 
whereas it has increased in industrial market econo-
mies. As Fig.  3 shows, industrial market economies 
in the early 19605 accounted for a little over half of 
world food imports and half of world food exports 
(excluding edible oils and  beverages).  By  the early 
19805, however,  they accounted for  only one-third 
of food  imports and contributed 70OJo  of food ex-
ports. In other words, these high-income countries 
switched from being slight net importers to massive 
net  exporters  of food  during  those  two  decades, 
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Fig. 2.  Increase in world food production and consump-
tion, total and per capita, 1961-64 to 1980-83. (The per-
centage by  which  production (consumption) in  19RO-83 
exceeded production (consumption) in 1961-64 of grains, 
meat, milk products and sugar, each valued at their aver-
age  price  in  international  markets  in  1980-82.  Source: 
Tyers and Anderson (forthcoming). 
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Fig. 3.  The distribution of world food trade, 1961-64 to 
1980-83. (Grains, meats, milk products and sugar trade, 
measured  in  US  dollars.)  Source:  Tyers  and Anderson 
(forthcoming). Table 1. Growth in food production, consumption, population and income per capita, 1961-64 to 1980-83 
(per cent per year) (Source: Tyers and Anderson forthcoming) 
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Clearly,  rapid  food  production  in  developing 
countries as a group has been accompanied by rapid 
increases in  that group's food  imports. But is  this 
pattern of food  demand growth outpacing supply 
growth  simply  a  response  to  the  decline  in  inter-
national  food  prices  shown  in  Fig.  1  (a  decline 
caused in large part by protection growth in  indus-
trial countries which has generated large surpluses 
that  have  been dumped on the international mar-
ket)?  A more stringent test of whether agricultural 
growth in  developing countries is  in  the economic 
interests of countries like Australia is to use the data 
of individual developing countries, and examine the 
correlation  between  real  growth  in  agricultural 
value added per capita or per farm worker and real 
growth in per capita imports from developed coun-
tries. Data for such tesls have been compiled, for at 
least  53  developing  countries with  populations in 
excess  of I million, for  the period  1970-84, as de-
tailed in  the footnotes to Table 2. 
From the first set of rows in  Table 2 it is  evident 
that agricultural output or productivity growth  in 
developing  countries  is  not  negatively  correlated 
with those countries' growth in imports from devel-
oped  countries.  On  the  contrary,  the  correlations 
are  positive and in some cases statistically signifi-
cant (with 53  observations, the coefficients are sig-
nificant at the 50lD  level  if they exceed  .27). 
While  causation cannot be  inferred  from  these 
positive  correlations,  these data are  certainly not 
supportive of the conventional argument. That is, 
agricultural  growth  in  developing  countries  may 
well  be consistent with Australia's economic inter-
est,  in  that our exports are growing  more rapidly 
with developing countries with faster rates of agri-
cultural expansion.  In addition, there is  the possi-
bility  that  faster  agricultural  growth  has  also 
benefited Australia in the form of lower-priced im-
ports of tropical products such  as  edible oils  and 
beverages, as well as in the form of any new techno-
logies that may be  transferable to  Australian agri-
culture  (evidence  of which  is  provided  in  J.  R. 

















Table 2. Coefficients of correlation between developing 
countries' per capita growth rates in agricultural output 
and imports from developed countries, 1970 to  1984.  a 
Growth in  real per capita 
imports from: 
United  All developed 
countries  States  Australia 
Growth in real agricultural GDpb: 
(a)  Total imports 
Per capita  .33 
Per farm worker'  .22 
(b)  Agricultural importsd 
Per capita  .07 
Per farm worker'  .08 
.28  .23 
.24  .09 
.07  .09 
.10  .01 
(a)  Growth between  1970~72 and 1982-84. The  1982~84 import 
values  are  deflated  to  1970~  72  dollars  using  the  United 
Nations' index of the unit value of total imports by develop-
ing countries and the FAO's index of the unit value of agricul-
tural imports by developing countries. 
(b)  Available  from  the World  Bank source only for  Ihe period 
1973  to 1984. 
(c)  The number of people engaged in  agricultural work  is  ob-
tained from the  E~O's Production Yearbook. 
(d)  Agricultural import, are classified as sections 0,1,2 (exclud-
ing 27, 28) and 4 of the Standard International Trade Classifi-
cation (SITC). 
Sources [or data: World Bank, World Development  Report 1986, 
Washington,  D.e.;  Food  and  Agricullure  Organisation.  Pro-
duction Yearbook and Trade Yearbook, Rome, various issues; and 
the trade data files  of the  Internalional Economic  Dala  Bank. 
Australian  National  University,  Canberra  (based  on  Cnited 
Nations data). 
Farmers in Australia, however, are concerned not 
about our total exports to developing countries but 
simply our agricultural exports. Yet even when one's 
perspective is  narrowed to the sectoral interest,  as 
distinct  from  the  national  economic  interest,  the 
conventional view  is  found wanting. As the second 
set  of rows  in  Table  2 shows,  the correlations are 
positive even  between agricultural growth  in deve-
loping  countries  and  agricultural  imports  from developed countries, including from Australia. And 
the correlations are positive even using agricultural 
imports net of each  developing country's agricul-
tural exports (not reported in Table 2). 
In short, the conventional view  that agricultural 
growth in developing countries is against Australia's 
economic  interest  is  not  supported  by  empirical 
evidence.'This raises the question: what is  omitted 
from the conventional argument presented earlier 
that provided the opposite view? 
Omissions in  the 
Conventional Argument 
The key  reason the commonly held  view  is  not 
supported by  the  facts  is  that it  is  based  on  an 
argument that focuses only on developing country 
supply conditions. That argument omits a number 
of demand considerations  that are  especially  im-
portant  in  economies  where  the  majority  of re-
sources  are  employed  directly  or  indirectly  in 
agriculture. 
When farmers adopt a new technology, their in-
comes  increase.  Presumably  they  will  spend  that 
extra income. Part of the increase is spent on extra 
farm inputs, and the rest  is  available to spend on 
consumer items or to invest. Thus the demand for 
food, for other internationally traded products and 
for  nontradable  goods  and  services  will  increase 
(both intermediate and final  consumer products). 
]n the case of tradable products other than the ones 
whose production technology has changed (suppose 
the  latter  is  staple  food),  the  increased  domestic 
demand  is  accommodated  by  a  reduction  in  the 
country's exports or an increase in its  imports of 
those products, with  no change in  their domestic 
production (assuming the producer prices for such 
products, which are related to international prices, 
do not change). That is, while the new  technology 
expands the supply of staple food  it also has the 
following  two  effects  on  traded  goods:  (a)  it  ex-
pands the domestic demand for food, which weak-
ens the negative effect of the developing country's 
net imports of staple food due to the supply expan-
sion; and (b) it expands the domestic demand for 
and hence  net  imports of other traded  products, 
which  may  include other agricultural products ex-
ported by Australia. 
If  all products were internationally tradable, this 
would  be  the  end  of the  story:  the  expenditure 
increase  associated  with  the  two  demand  shifts 
could not be more than the increase in farm income 
due to the new  technology,  and so the developing 
country's net  imports at given international prices 
would not be greater than before. This would sug-
gest  that  the positive  correlations  in  Table  2  are 
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spurious.  They  may,  for  example,  simply  reflect 
that countries with rapid agricultural growth hap-
pen  to  be  countries with  rapid  income growth  in 
other sectors, and that the latter is  driving up food 
imports.  However,  there  is  a  third  set  of effects 
omitted from the conventional argument that need 
to be considered. A substantial share of expenditure 
is  on products and services  which  by  their nature 
cannot  be  traded  internationally.  An  increase  in 
farm incomes therefore also increases the demand 
for  nontradables.  Since  by  definition  such  goods 
must be produced domestically, this increase in the 
country's domestic demand for nontradables raises 
the price of nontradables and attracts resources into 
the  nontradables  sector.  This  has  two  important 
effects. One is  that less  resources are available to 
produce traded products, so net imports (including 
agricultural imports) need to be greater because of 
this effect. The other is  that incomes of producers 
of nontradables  rise.  That  is,  the  direct  income 
boost for farmers due to the new technology gener-
ates an indirect income boost to producers of non-
tradables. This indirect effect further  expands the 
domestic demand for various traded products and 
so further  increases the country's net  imports. (A 
formal  analysis  of these  effects,  in  a  somewhat 
different context, is provided by Corden 1984.) 
With this more complete analysis it is  now poss-
ible to understand the reasons for the positive corre-
lations  in  Table  2  between  agricultural  output 
growth  and growth  in  agricultural imports.  First, 
the effects of new  farm  technology on staple food 
imports  are  less  than  the  conventional  argument 
suggests, because that argument ignores the effect 
of the  technology  in  boosting  farm  incomes  and 
hence farmers'  demands for  both staple food  and 
other goods and services,  including nontradables. 
It therefore also ignores the second-round effects of 
increased  incomes for  producers of nontradables, 
which also increase the domestic demand for staple 
food  and other traded goods.  Moreover,  the con-
ventional argument ignores the possibility that the 
market  for  other  traded  goods,  net  imports  of 
which are increased as a consequence of technical 
change in staple food production, may also include 
agricultural products. It might be, for example, that 
a  new  rice technology results in  increased  net im-
port demand for more luxurious and higher-valued 
foods such as meat and dairy products and/or for 
wheat  that,  after  processing  into  bread,  involves 
less preparation time at home. Or it might simply 
be that newly adopted intensive livestock techniques 
expand the demand for  feedgrain imports. 
For  this  combination of reasons,  together with 
the  obvious  fact  that  higher  incomes allow  more 
investment and hence greater economic growth, it is 
not  so  surprising  that  agricultural  productivity growth in developing countries is  associated with 
increased  imports,  including agricultural imports, 
from  Australia.  Nonetheless,  one  might  suspect 
that agricultural imports would not grow for deve-
loping countries whose agricultural growth covers a 
wide spectrum of farm products. For that reason it 
is  useful to examine the case of China, which  has 
had one of the world's fastest-growing agricultural 
sectors in the past decade. 
A Case Study: China 
Farm output in  China increased  by  more than 
half between 1978 and 1984. Increases occurred for 
virtually all commodities produced in China: grain 
by  5070  per year,  red meat and sugar by more than 
10%,  cotton  by  almost  20%  per  year,  ete.  As  a 
result, China's share of the world market for grain, 
livestock products and sugar rose from  12  to  17% 
over that period. It might well be imagined that this 
massive  addition to world  food  supplies  contrib-
uted  significantly to the downturn in  world  food 
prices  shown  in  Fig.  I-until one is  reminded  to 
think also about the changing demand for  food in 
China.  As  it  happens,  China's self-sufficiency  in 
these foods actually jell, from 100% in 1970-74 to 
970/0  in 1980-84, because domestic demand growth 
out  paced  the  growth  in  supplies  (Anderson  and 
Tyers  1987). 
Indeed China's agricultural imports have grown 
almost  as  rapidly  as  its  total  imports:  between 
1970-72  and  1982-84,  China's  total  imports  in-
creased eightfold in nominal terms, and agricultural 
imports increased sevenfold (Table 3).  From devel-
oped countries alone agricultural imports increased 
tenfold, which was  even  more than total imports. 
Only for the United States was the increase in agri-
cultural exports to China much less  than its  total 
export growth,  but  that  was  because of a  virtual 
embargo on non-food exports to China in the early 
1970s. 
Moreover,  even  if agricultural output in  China 
continues to expand at the rapid rates targeted by 
the government for the next decade or so, it is likely 
that China will still have to increase its agricultural 
imports,  notwithstanding  its  small  agricultural 
trade surplus in  1984-85. One series of projections 
is summarised in Table 4, taken from Anderson and 
Tyers  (1987).  The reference  case  projection incor-
porates  the  government's  production  targets,  as-
sumes  food  prices  will  be  kept  at  their  1980-82 
levels  in  real  terms,  and  assumes  China's  popu-
lation and real national income grow  at 1.2% and 
6.3% per year to 1995.  In that reference case, self-
sufficiency  falls  for  all  foods  shown  except  rice. 
This is  largely because the effect of assumed rapid 
income growth on demand outstrips the effect of 
the assumed rate of technical change in agriculture 
on domestic food supplies. 
Suppose, however,  that China's national income 
were  to  grow  less  rapidly  than  assumed  in  that 
reference projection. This would of course reduce 
the growth in demand for food and other products. 
But  since  more  than  two-thirds  of  China's 
workforce is  still employed in  agriculture, and the 
farm  sector  accounts  for  more than  one-third of 
national income, it is  likely that a slower growth in 
income would be the result of slower growth in farm 
output.  The  net  effect  on  food  import  demand 
would then depend on the extent to which these two 
effects, on domestic supply and domestic demand, 
offset each other.  A  second  scenario  is  therefore 
given  in  Table  4,  in  which  the  rate of growth  of 
national  income  is  assumed  to  be  1  percentage 
point less than in  the reference case (5.3 instead of 
6.3070  per  year,  or  16%  lower)  and  food  output 
growth is  also reduced  by  16%. The net result  is 
that with slower growth, China is  projected to re-
duce its  net imports of virtually all  these agricul-
tural products, except coarse grains (which increase 
slightly to help supplement the reduced volume of 
domestically produced feedgrains available for ani-
mals). These results provide further support for the 
above argument that agricultural output growth in 
Table 3. China's total and agricultural imports, 1970-72 and 1982-84a  (current US$ million per year) (Source: 
International Economic Data Bank, Australian National University, Canberra). 
Total imports  Agricultural imports  b 
........ ~~~-
1970-72  1982-84  (2)  -7  (I)  1970-72  1982-84  (5)  -7  (4) 
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
From 
World  1 827  15  194  8.3  558  3867  6.9 
Developed Countries  I 388  12590  9.1  304  2985  9.8 
United States  212  2685  12.7  204  I  232  6.0 
Australia  68  637  9.4  53  455  8.6 
a Based  on the reponed exports of other countries to China, which are more complete than China's import statistics. 
b Agricultural imports are classified as Sections 0.1,2 (excluding 27, 28) and 4 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITe). 
31 Table 4. China's net imports and self-sufficiency in food 
products, 1980-83 and 1995  (source: Anderson and 
Tyers  (1987, table 6». 
Net  Self-
imports  sufficiency 
(kt)  (0/0 ) 
Wheat 
Actual 1980-83  12400  84 
Projected 1995-reference  39500  71 
-slower growth  37  100  71 
Coarse grain 
Actual  1980-83  1080  99 
Projected 1995-reference  12200  91 
-slower growth  13400  89 
Beef and sheep meat 
Actual 1980-83  -60  108 
Projected 1995-reference  190  89 
-slower growth  140  91 
Pork and poultry meat 
Actual  1980-83  -60  100 
Projected 1995-reference  5400  82 
-slower growth  4390  84 
Dairy products 
Actual  1980-83  320  96 
Projected  I  995-reference  15480  49 
-slower growth  11000  54 
Rice 
Actual 1980-83  -530  100 
Projected 1995-reference  -1400  101 
-slower growth  1470  99 
Sugar 
Actual  1980-83  1090  81 
Projected 1995-reference  6150  64 
-slower growth  5 100  65 
a developing country can be consistent with agricul-
tural import growth. 
Should Australia Actively  Promote 
LDC Agricultural Growth? 
Having  established  that  agricultural  growth  in 
developing countries may  be associated with a rise 
in those COUlltries' agricultural imports from devel-
oped coulltries, including Australia, could it  be  in 
the latter's economic  interest  to actively  promote 
such growth? One way  to do so is  to sell  to LDCs 
our agricultural  management and  research  skills, 
technological  knowledge,  genetic material and the 
like. A more generous way is to give away such items 
as part of our aid program. 
Selling Skills, Genes, etc. to LDCs 
A number of concerns have been expressed about 
what are perceived to be  Australia's sources 
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of agricultural comparative advantage.  Wool pro-
ducers, for example, have long argued for prohibi-
tions or at least limitations on the export of Merino 
genetic material from Australia. Bm such concerns 
are primarily based on the adverse effect of such 
exports on certain private interests as distinct from 
the national interest. The only national interest case 
that  might  be  made  is  where  Australia  has  some 
monopoly power  in  the  international  market  for 
such  genetic  material,  in  which  case  the  optimal 
export tax would be positive (but certainly not infi-
nite, as  with an export embargo) rather than zero. 
Even  then,  it  would  have  to  be  argued  that  the 
optimal  export  tax  is  above  the  implicit  tax  on 
exports that already is in place by way of tariffs and 
quotas on imports of manufactures into Australia 
(Clements and Sjaastad  1984).  A  recent review  of 
the evidence would suggest that Merino genetic ma-
terial is unlikely to be deserving on national interest 
grounds of an additional explicit export tax (Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics  1986). The situation is 
simply that much of the reason Australia produces 
high  quality  fine  wool  is  that it  has  high-quality 
managers of stud and commercial sheep properties: 
its inherent genetic material today is  unlikely to be 
significantly different from that in South Africa or 
a  number  of other  countries.  If Australian  ram 
prices can be raised by  allowing overseas buyers to 
purchase at auction,  then this  is  to  the good and 
more wool growers should move into the business of 
producing rams and other genetic material for  ex-
port. True, the higher ram prices would add a little 
to the production costs of commercial wool produc-
ers,  but to the extent  that Australian genetic ma-
terial  is  superior then  buyers  will  pay  for  it  and 
Australia will be exploiting more fully its compara-
tive advantage than if it limits such exports. 
The same argument can be made about Australia 
exporting its agricultural research and management 
skills.  Such  skills  provide  an internationally  trad-
able  service  that  is  highly  valued.  Indeed  the  net 
export earnings generated by the research and con-
sulting  activities  of  some  agricultural  scientists 
would be considerably higher per person than that 
generated  by  the average  farmer in  Australia.  Yet 
Australia does not have a monopoly on such skills, 
so it is not in the national interest to restrict exports 
of those skills, especially in the longer run. Indeed 
if restrictions  were  imposed,  two  adverse  effects 
would  result.  First,  scientists  would  tend  to  emi-
grate to countries where  they  were  free  to operate 
internationally, so reducing Australia's export earn-
ings from consulting as well as reducing the number 
of agricultural scientsts in Australia.  And second, 
developing countries would simply turn to countries 
other than Australia for  such skills,  so the effects 
on their economies would  be  no different than if 
Australia supplied those skills. Giving Away  Skills, Genes, etc. to  LDCs 
This is not the place to argue the pros and cons of 
providing foreign aid in general (see,  for example, 
the 1984 Jaekson Committee Report for such argu-
ments).  But given that Australia wishes to spend a 
particular sum on foreign  aid, is it in the national 
interest  to spend  that  aid  on  boosting  food  pro-
duction in developing countries by providing skills, 
genes  and other  perceived  sources  of Australia's 
agricultural comparative advantage? The answer is: 
probably. To  see this it is  necessary to consider the 
effects, from both the recipient country's viewpoint 
as well  as Australia'S, of tying aid in this way. 
The recipient developing country will  be largely 
indifferent to whether the aid is  tied  or not, pro-
vided that country would have otherwise acquired 
such goods  and  services  anyway  (either  domesti-
cally or from the international market). The reason 
has to do with the fungibility of aid. The conven-
tional wisdom is that aid in the form of agricultural 
research  and management skills,  genetic material, 
etc.  expands  the developing country's agricultural 
potential. This reduces the country's net imports of 
food  (or expands its  net  exports  in  the case of a 
food-surplus  LDC),  and  possibly  shifts the  inter-
national  terms  of trade  against  food  if the  pro-
duction shift is large enough, thereby harming food 
exporters  such  as  Australia,  it  is  argued.  Apart 
from  the reasons  already outlined as  to why  this 
conventional argument is incomplete, there is a fur-
ther question to consider, namely what would have 
occurred  in  the  absence of that aid?  Presumably 
this developing country would have invested in vari-
ous development  projects which  expanded  its  po-
tential  for  producing  goods  in  general.  I f  that 
country  in  any  case  would  have  invested  in  the 
particular agricultural project Australia has funded 
(along with  its  numerous  other investment  activi-
ties), then the provision of that aid for  this part of 
its investment program simply adds to the country's 
total  investable  resources  and allows  its  other re-
sources  (including  aid  from  elsewhere)  to  be 
diverted to other projects. That is,  aid-even tied 
aid-expands the developing country's production 
potential in  all sectors, not just in the staple food 
sector. 
If  aid is so fungible, why should Australia bother 
to tie it to agricultural projects requiring skills, etc. 
available in Australia? Presumably part of the rea-
son is  simply  to  ensure those skills  are purchased 
from Australia rather than from other countries. * 
As  argued  above,  this  does not necessarily  mean 
less of those skills are available to work on Austra-
lian problems,  since the aid project is  likely  to be 
too small to have an impact on the global demand 
and hence the international price for those skills. It 
simply means that Australia's excess supply of those 
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skills would be partly absorbed by  the aid project. 
Tying  aid in  this  way  does,  however,  add a  more-
specifically  and  more-visibly  Australian  image to 
the aid project, which may be considered desirable 
for nationalistic reasons.  It also provides a  means 
for  disseminating  information  about  Australian 
skills and technology (although more conventional 
means  such  as  Austrade  could  probably  provide 
that dissemination service at much lower cost). 
Summary and Policy Implications 
The conventional view that agricultural growth in 
developing countries reduces their agricultural im-
ports,  and  therefore  is  against  the  interests  of 
agricultural-exporting countries such as Australia, 
is  not supported by  empirical evidence.  The argu-
ment  on  which  that  view  is  based  is  incomplete 
because it  considers only the effects on LDC agri-
cultural supply. What also needs to be considered is 
the  effect  of increased  rural  productivity  on  per 
capita incomes and hence on the demand for agri-
cultural and other products. When demand as well 
as  supply  conditions  are  taken  into  account,  es-
pecially in  the nontradables market,  it  is  not sur-
prising that there is  a positive correlation between 
agricultural  output growth  and agricultural  input 
growth of LDCs. Moreover,  since 60070  of Austra-
lian exports are non-agricultural, a  better index of 
Australia  '5 economic interest is growth in  LDC total 
rather  than  just  agricultural  imports  from 
Australia-and  the  data  show  LDC  agricultural 
growth  to be even  morc  positively correlated with 
that indicator. 
China provides a striking example for illustrating 
these  points.  Agricultural  output  in  China  in-
creased by 50070  between 1978 and 1984. Yet despite 
that,  agricultural  exports  to  China  have  grown 
enormously over  the past decade.  And, according 
to one set of projections at least, they are likely to 
continue to  be  positively  correlated  with  agricul-
tural output growth during the next  decade. 
It then  follows  that,  if agricultural  growth  in 
developing countries is  consistent with Australia '5 
economic interests, it pays Australia to actively pro-
mote such growth,  for example through exporting 
* Another part of the reason may be a concern that for 
domestic political reasons, or because of a lack of infor-
mation on the profitability of different  investment pro-
jects.  a  developing  country  would  not  invest  in  a 
particular high-payoff project that uses Australian goods 
and services  unless aid were  tied to that project. In  such 
circumstances it is possible that such tied aid could boost 
economic growth  in  that country and at  the  same  time 
benefit  Australia  more  than if the same  amount of aid 
were given untied. 
----------------------~  ---- .. --------------agricultural research and management skills.  Pay-
ing  for  such exports via  the  foreign  aid  budget is 
another  way  to  promote  agricultural  growth 
abroad. 
Is it possible to say anything about which com-
modities Australia might concentrate its aid efforts? 
Wool  producers  have  argued,  for  example,  that 
Australia should explicitly exclude wool production 
assistance projects from  its  aid  program,  presum-
ably  on  the  grounds  that  this  is  more  likely  to 
reduce Australia's export prospects than aid for, say, 
rice production. Such a conclusion is  not possible, 
however, when it is recognised that demand consid-
erations  and  intersectoral  effects  need  also  to  be 
taken into account in addition to direct effects on 
commodity supply. It would be a brave person who 
tries to predict the nef effect on Australian export 
earnings of any particular form of aid to developing 
country  farmers:  the  outcome  depends  among 
other things on myriad elasticities of substitution in 
production and consumption both within agricul-
ture and between agriculture and other sectors in 
the recipient country. 
To conclude, three final points about the benefit 
of providing  agricultural  assistance  to developing 
countries should be made. Firstly, it need hardly be 
said that assistance to developing countries is moti-
vated by  more than just economic gains to donor 
countries by  way of trade expansion. Many people 
are prepared to support aid to agricultural projects 
for  humanitarian  reasons,  because  they  perceive 
that this will help the poorest people in developing 
countries most. 
Secondly,  further benefits to Australia as  well  as 
developing countries might result if the provision of 
aid-financed improved production teehnology is ac-
companied by Australian direct  foreign investment 
in processing and marketing agricultural products. 
An  obvious example is  milk.  In  many developing 
countries the dairy industry is in its infancy and per 
capita consumption of this  relative  luxury is  low. 
Because of Australian aid  the recipient country is 
more likely to be sympathetic to requests from Aus-
tralian processing/marketing firms to invest in that 
country. This not only has the direct advantage of 
earning investment income from  that eoumry but 
also a number of potential indirect advantages. For 
example, if that Australian firm is better able than a 
local  firm  to  promote  milk  products  and  hence 
increase the domestic demand for  milk,  then  this 
contributes  to  overall  milk  demand  growth  and 
hence benefits Australia's dairy export sector. 
And finally,  such aid is  likely to add to political 
stability.  This is  especially true in  China, where a 
----------.... -~~.-- ..  _  .... _----- ..... 
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reduction in food self-sufficiency could well lead to 
a political backlash against the process of general 
economic reform. The consequences of such a reac-
tion might well  include barriers to agricultural im-
ports along the lines of other East Asian countries, 
with the usual adverse welfare effects not only for 
China but also for agricultural-exporting countries 
(Anderson et  al.  1986).  This  makes  it  even  more 
sensible that Australia should be assisting agricul-
tural development in China especially. 
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KYM Anderson's paper fulfils a number of purposes as it addresses the issues raised 
by the organisers of this Symposium. It should help to disabuse the audience of the 
commonplace (and usually wrong) conclusion that Australia, and its  farmers,  are 
somehow worse off because of the modest contribution that Australian  foreign aid 
has made to the increase in agricultural output in developing countries. Not that this 
is likely to be particularly important for those who attended the symposium, who are 
likely to  be predisposed towards recognising the advantages of aid, but  to  a wider 
audience who now have had put before them a cogent and straightforward treatment 
of the relevant theory and important facts that are helpful in making a judgment on 
this question. 
As  Anderson points out in  his  introduction,  the conventional argument  has  a 
superficial appeal. Farmers are used  to being told that their declining fortunes are 
due to depressed international markets with  burgeoning supplies from  other coun-
tries.  Developing countries have expanded their food output-so how can it be that 
the net economic effect of their success can be  favourable  to Australia whereas the 
production and trade policies of Japan, the United States and the European Com-
munity are generally agreed to be damaging? Simply put, the clue to  this apparent 
paradox is to realise that the conventional argument ignores demand considerations 
and that increasing agricultural output in  developing  countries  increases income, 
whereas,  in  most of the developed  world,  increased  agricultural output achieved 
through protectionist policies is  at the expense of income. 
The agricultural sector is so large in countries like China, India and Indonesia that 
it  is  almost axiomatic  that  economic growth  requires  an  increase  in  agricultural 
output. All cases of successful economic development have required some contribu-
tions from the agricultural sector because economic growth requires an increase in 
the proportion of a country's annual production which is devoted to capital accumu-
lation.  As  the  greater  part  of a  developing  country's  population  is  engaged  in 
agriculture, the agricultural sector must play a large part in the process of increasing 
the  proportion of national  income  that  is  saved  and  invested.  In  essence,  the 
expansion of the nonagricultural sector has  to depend  upon an initial increase in 
farmers' incomes, which generates employment through their expenditure. Farmers 
benefit in  the second round because the newly-employed people spend most of their 
incremental income increases on food. 
The countries that assist this process by providing foreign aid have the potential to 
share in  the gains from economic growth as the additional income is  spent. Income 
elasticities of demand for  food  are  much higher  in  developing  than in  developed 
countries especially  for  non-staple  agricultural  products.  Kym  Anderson  has  re-
ported plausible empirical confirmation that there is  a positive association between 
agricultural output growth in developing countries and their imports of food  from 
Australia and other developed countries.  Reassuring as  this is, it would not be the 
* Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics,  Macarthur  House,  Northbourne  Avenue,  Lyneham, 
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35 end of the argument even if there had been a contraction in imports of food per se-
a country like Australia has the potential to benefit from economic growth  as  well 
through its exports of other commodities to developing countries. 
Perhaps this aspect of the argument could have  been developed more in  Ander-
son's paper. When a large country, such as China, starts to grow there are all sorts of 
opportunities for sales of goods and services for a country such as Australia. Both 
countries are likely  to benefit  most if these activities are concentrated in  areas of 
Australia's comparative advantage-in this context, it  is  hard to envisage a satisfac-
tory aid or trade arrangement that turned its back on the wool industry, which is an 
area of Australian specialisation sine qua non. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to 
think of the effects of aid in purely agricultural terms since agricultural aid will spill 
over into increased demand for  other commodities. Sometimes, Australian farmers 
could have the legitimate complaint that aid, offered by the nation as a whole, has in 
fact been developed by research systems that have  been largely  funded by  farmers. 
An interesting twist to Anderson's paper is to place the economics of foreign aid 
within the genre of 'booming sector' or 'Dutch disease' economics, which in Austra-
lian parlance is  the world of Gregory effects. This is  because foreign aid, as  a gift 
from outside, can be considered analogously to the increase in  income that is  made 
possible by a new mineral discovery or a sharp rise in prices and so on. The economic 
literature in this field is vast and covers a large range of cases. Whilst, in a typically 
Australian way,  there was a tendency to interpret Gregory's writings (and the contri-
butions of other commentators) in  a negative way  by  concentrating on the adjust-
ment costs  for other sectors that such changes bring about, the original paper of 
Gregory was  emphatic on at least one point-that is,  the country on the receiving 
end of a resources boom, a Dutch disease or foreign aid has the potential to be better 
off.  The key,  of course, is  the translation of the increased income into  increased 
output through successive rounds of investment. If  the boost to income is dissipated 
through consumption or investments with low rates of return, then the process need 
not be as advantageous as it could be  to the recipient in the long haul. 
Another insight from Anderson's paper is  the emphasis on the fungibility of aid 
which, in  economic terms, makes the issue of tied and untied aid somewhat irrele-
vant, since  following  any  aid the recipient country has additional resources at its 
disposal 'in all sectors, not just in the staple food  sector.' 
In conclusion, there would seem  to be a further advantage in Australian partici-
pation in agricultural aid programs that goes  beyond the issues discussed in Ander-
son's paper. That is,  the aid effort adds to  Australia's presence and affords some 
limited protection that our interests will not be ignored in trade negotiations between 
larger nation states. 
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